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Abstract
We develop an analytical framework of peer interaction in the sharing economy that
incorporates reciprocity, the tendency to increase (decrease) effort in response to others'
increased (decreased) effort. In our model, buyers (sellers) can induce sellers (buyers) to
exert more effort by behaving well themselves. We demonstrate that this joint increased
effort can improve the utility of both parties and influence the market equilibrium.
We also show that bilateral reputation systems, which allow both buyers and sellers
to review each other, are more responsive to reciprocity than unilateral reputation
systems. By rewarding reciprocal behavior, bilateral reputation systems generate trust
among strangers and informally regulate their behavior. We test the predictions of our
model using data from Airbnb, a popular peer-to-peer accommodation platform. We
show that Airbnb hosts that are more reciprocal receive higher ratings, and that higher
rated hosts can increase their prices. Therefore, reciprocity affects equilibrium prices
on Airbnb through its impact on ratings, as predicted by our analytical framework.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few years, we have witnessed the rapid growth of peer-to-peer marketplaces
like Airbnb (accommodation), Uber (transportation), and TaskRabbit (chores and errands).
Compared to traditional marketplaces for similar services, peer-to-peer markets have two
distinguishing features. First, service quality is heterogeneous and can vary significantly
both between suppliers and from one occasion to the next. Second, transactions in peer-to-
peer markets entail the close interaction of individual buyers and sellers.
In this paper, we study these peer interaction patterns, focusing in particular on reci-
procity: a social norm under which people respond to others' actions with an equivalent
action. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that reciprocity regulates the be-
havior of peer-to-peer market participants thus affecting both service quality and market
outcomes. In doing so, we provide an interesting connection between peer-to-peer market-
places and behavioral economics. Our model is also the first, to the best of our knowledge,
to apply interdependent preferences to study peer interactions in the sharing economy, and
to show that this interdependence is more salient in these new marketplaces when compared
to traditional marketplaces for similar services.
Before proceeding, we note the term reciprocity has been used to refer to two different
concepts in two main strands of literature that we build upon: the literature on online reviews
and reputation, and the behavioral economics literature on trust, fairness, and cooperation.
In the online reputation literature, reciprocity refers to strategic reviewing behavior where
positive (negative) feedback from one party is likely to be reciprocated with positive (neg-
ative) feedback from the other party (Dellarocas and Wood, 2008; Resnick and Zeckhauser,
2002). In the behavioral economics literature, reciprocity refers to the tendency of market
participants to respond to good (bad) behavior with good (bad) behavior (Sobel, 2005). We
use the term reciprocity in the behavioral economics sense.
The sharing economy is a natural setting for reciprocity to arise. Take for instance
Airbnb, an online marketplace for short-term accommodation rentals that has emerged as an
alternative to hotels (Zervas et al., 2017; Farronato and Fradkin, 2018). According to Airbnb,
most hosts rent the place they live in, and are likely to closely interact with their guests.1
Some Airbnb hosts provide home cooked meals, take their guests on neighborhood tours, or
pick their guests up from the airport. Airbnb guests can reward exceptional hospitality by
keeping the place clean, being respectful of neighbors, or leaving small gifts for their hosts.
Airbnb user testimonials suggest that this type of behavior is both common and greatly
1See: http://blog.airbnb.com/economic-impact-airbnb/.
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valued by guests and hosts alike.2
We formalize this intuition by developing an analytical framework of peer interaction in
the sharing economy. Taking Airbnb as our use case, we model the quality of each Airbnb
stay as a function of the joint effort of hosts and guests. In deciding how much effort to
exert during each stay, hosts and guests take into account each others' reciprocity preferences.
These preferences can vary. For example, some hosts will respond to a small gift by taking
better care of their guests, while others won't. Airbnb guests can induce reciprocal hosts
to exert more effort by behaving better themselves. Reciprocal hosts respond to increased
guest effort by increasing their own effort levels and, as a result, earn higher ratings from
their guests. Therefore, in our model hosts who are more reciprocal have higher ratings. In
turn, higher ratings lead to increases in demand and, consequently, more reciprocal hosts
can charge higher prices. Thus, our model predicts that reciprocity influences prices through
its effect on ratings.
After presenting our theoretical framework, we use data from Airbnb to test the predic-
tions of our model. First, we show that reciprocity and ratings are positively correlated.
To do so, we begin by identifying Airbnb hosts who are likely to be reciprocal, i.e., hosts
who value their guests' behavior. Because we cannot directly measure reciprocity, we rely
on proxies. Our preferred proxy is the length of the reviews hosts leave for their guests.
Unlike listing reviews, which usually describe both the host and her property, the reviews
hosts leave for their guests focus on the person being accommodated. We hypothesize that
hosts who take the time to write detailed reviews about their guests, are more likely to care
about their guests' conduct, and, therefore, to value reciprocity more. As hypothesized, we
find that hosts who write longer guest reviews have higher ratings. This result is robust to
alternative proxies for reciprocity, which we discuss in detail in Section 5.
Our model is also able to explain a novel pattern we identify in the Airbnb data that
is not easily explained under alternative plausible models of peer behavior. We show that
Airbnb hosts who list their properties for rent on Airbnb frequently (whom, for simplicity,
we will refer to as professional hosts) have lower ratings than those with less frequent market
participation (whom we will refer to as casual hosts). Moreover, this relationship is indepen-
dent of the degree of social interaction between guests and hosts, and thus unlikely to be the
effect of social bias arising from face-to-face interaction between hosts and guests (Fradkin
et al., 2017). Taken together, these two observations suggest that casual hosts offer higher
levels of quality than professional hosts. To explain this finding, we show that there is a
negative association between reciprocity and market participation. Thus, we argue that the
higher ratings of casual hosts can, at least in part, be explained by their increased preference
2See, for instance, https://www.airbnb.com/info/why_host.
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for reciprocity.
We conclude our analysis by showing that reciprocity has important implications for
market equilibrium. Our model predicts that reciprocity affects ratings which in turn affect
prices. We test the prediction that Airbnb listing prices respond positively to ratings by
exploiting a unique feature of the Airbnb reputation system: Airbnb discloses a host's average
rating only after the host collects three reviews. We argue that the timing of these rating
disclosures is exogenous and show that listing prices respond positively to the disclosure of
high ratings, even after controlling for changes in listing quality. Taken together, our results
suggest that reciprocity can explain the higher ratings, and thus higher prices, of casual
hosts.
Besides demonstrating the impact of reciprocity on market equilibrium and prices, our
work contributes to a more comprehensive understanding on how trust is generated in peer-
to-peer markets (Tadelis, 2016; Einav et al., 2016). Reciprocity in the sharing economy can
act as a social norm (Gouldner, 1960), generating trust between market participants (Mal-
mendier et al., 2014). When two agents trade, one agent's poor conduct can trigger negative
reciprocity and the agent is punished by the other party. Similarly, an agent's good conduct
triggers positive reciprocity and the agent is rewarded by the other party. Thus, agents may
choose to behave well both to motivate good conduct from the other party, and to avoid the
threat of negative reciprocity. Through this mechanism, reciprocity can regulate behavior
and generate trust among users.
2 Related literature
Next, we discuss two relevant strands of literature, on reciprocity and reputation, and high-
light connections to our work.
Our work studies the role of reciprocity in promoting improved behavior and cooperation
in peer-to-peer platforms. The definition of reciprocity that we adopt in this paper is similar
to that of Sobel (2005), who defines reciprocity as a tendency to respond to perceived
kindness with kindness and perceived meanness with meanness and to expect this behavior
from others. A large body of research finds that reciprocity is a important determinant of
behavior (see, for example, Kahneman et al. (1986); Fehr and Gächter (2000)). Fehr and
Gächter (2000) survey applications of reciprocity in several areas of economics, emphasizing
the role of reciprocity in encouraging collective action. In our setting, we investigate how
hosts and guest act collectively to improve their joint experience.
Rabin (1993) was the first to propose intention-based reciprocity, the tendency of players
to reward good intentions and punish bad intentions. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) investigate
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the role of intentions in driving reciprocity whereby actions with identical consequences can
result in different reciprocal responses depending on how fair these action are perceived to
be. Malmendier et al. (2014) discuss recent theoretical and experimental developments in
reciprocity research, arguing that reciprocity is internal in that it arises from an individual's
preference to act in a way that rewards good behavior by others. Our concept of shared
experience utility builds on these insights, by enabling marketplace participants to rewards
or punish each others' behavior.
Finally, Rotemberg (2006) survey economic models of reciprocity in the context of orga-
nizational economics, distinguishing reciprocity from other types of social preference, such
as altruism. We also consider altruism as a possible way to explain our findings, but argue
that reciprocity is better suited to explaining the patterns in our data.
Our work also relates to a large marketing literature on reputation, feedback systems,
and rating biases in online markets. A number of papers have studied the effects of seller
reputation across different settings. For example, Luca (2016); Anderson and Magruder
(2012) show that Yelp ratings affect restaurant revenue and the likelihood of being sold out,
and Yoganarasimhan (2013) shows that better rated freelancers in an online labor market
are more likely to be chosen by buyers and can charge higher prices. Our theoretical model
makes similar predictions to Yoganarasimhan (2013), and we find similar patterns in the
Airbnb data: hosts with higher ratings tend to charge higher prices.
Closely related to our setting, a number of papers have studied bilateral reputation
systems. Early studies focused on eBay, one of the first platforms introducing a bilateral
reputation mechanism, in which buyers and sellers review each other after a transaction.
Among others, Dellarocas and Wood (2008) and Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) show that
ratings on eBay are extremely positive, and that there is substantial amount of feedback
reciprocation  a practice in which the receipt of a positive (negative) feedback from a trans-
action party increases the likelihood of the other party to also report a positive (negative)
feedback. More recently Fradkin et al. (2017) studied the bilateral reputation system of
Airbnb, and reported similar reporting bias. Fradkin et al. (2017) argue that the bias in this
case is generated by socially induced reciprocity whereby users tend to under-report negative
feedback following an in-person interaction with the other party. Horton and Golden (2015)
also study reputation inflation in online markets, and show that negative ratings are more
likely to be under-reported when they are public.
For an extensive review of the literature on reputation and feedback systems on online
platforms, we refer the reader to Tadelis (2016), Edelman (2017), and Seiler et al. (2018).
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3 Theoretical framework
In this section, we introduce our analytical framework of peer interaction in sharing economy.
Below, we describe the model in the setting of Airbnb, but the model can be extended to
other markets.
3.1 Setup
Since our main focus is the interaction between hosts and guests, we assume a monopolistic
host and a continuum of guests in our model. Prices are posted by the host, which matches
the price-posting feature on Airbnb.
The extensive-form game of our model is as follows:
1. In period 1, the host chooses price P1 for her listing, and every customer decides
whether to enter the market, i.e., pay the host to book the accommodation.
2. In period 2 (the accommodation period), the guest stays at host's listing. Both the
host and the guest i determine the effort level to exert during the stay. Then, each
guest i who stays at the host's property publishes a rating rh,i, and the host publishes
a rating ri for the guest i.
3. In period 3, another unit mass of guests enters the market. The host and period 3
guests observe the first period demand and the average rating disclosed in period 2.
The host chooses price P3 for her listing, and the customers decide whether to enter
the market according to the disclosed rating and the price observed.
We solve the equilibrium by backward induction from period 2 to period 1. Since the
subgame in period 2 is the main focus of our analysis, we introduce the setup of period 2
first.
Period 2: Accommodation In period 2, guest i and the host h choose effort levels by
maximizing their respective ex-post utilities:
Ui(ei|eh, ri) = vh + αiu(ei, eh)− Ci(ei) + βiri (1)
Uh(eh|ei, rh,i) = vi + αhu(ei, eh)− Ch(eh) + βhrh,i (2)
The two utility functions are symmetric in the identities of the agents, i and h. To simplify
notation, we will use the subscript j  e.g. Uj  to refer to either utility function.
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Utility is composed of three parts. The first part, vj+αju(ei, eh), denotes utility obtained
during accommodation. The terms vh and vi are exogenous factors affecting accommodation
quality. For example, vh could be the location of the listing. Similarly, vi are the characteris-
tics of guest i that affect the host's utility and that are not endogenously determined by the
guest's effort, for instance whether guest i has a pet. We assume vh and vi to be fixed and
exogenously given, and to follow a uniform distribution over [0, v¯h] and [0, v¯i] respectively.
The term u(ei, eh) captures the utility the host h and the guest i derive from interacting
with each other, which we refer to as the shared experience utility. The shared experience
utility is a function of host effort eh and guest effort ei. An example of eh may be a smooth
check-in experience, or providing information about local attractions. An example of ei may
be a guest who follows the house rules. Introducing the shared experience term in the utility
function allows us to formally model the social interaction between hosts and guests. Related
work in marketing and economics, has also considered the idea that interpersonal interaction
can directly affect agents' utility (see, for example, Charness (2004) and Blanchard et al.
(2016)).
We allow for heterogeneity on the weight agents place on the shared experience utility
by introducing the terms αj, which we will refer to as reciprocity weights. This allows for
some hosts to care more than other about the behavior of their guests.
We assume that both host and guest effort positively impact the shared experience utility,
i.e.:
∂u(ei, eh)
∂ei
> 0,
∂u(ei, eh)
∂eh
> 0. (3)
Further, we model reciprocity by assuming:
∂2u(ei, eh)
∂ei∂eh
> 0. (4)
This condition states that increased host effort improves the guest's marginal shared expe-
rience utility, i.e.,
if eh > e
′
h, then
∂u(ei,eh)
∂ei
>
∂u(ei,e
′
h)
∂ei
, given the same level of ei.
Similarly, increased guest effort improves the host's marginal shared experience utility.
Our reciprocity assumption is in line with similar assumptions invoked in intrinsic reci-
procity models, such as the intention-based reciprocity model (Rabin, 1993) and type-based
model (Levine, 1998). As pointed out by Malmendier et al. (2014), under these theories,
people reciprocate because another person's kind act or benevolent nature increases the in-
trinsic utility of acting kindly toward this person. Thus, such preferences are internal in that
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they arise from an individual's preference to act in a way that rewards good behavior by
others. Our assumption ∂
2u(ei,eh)
∂ei∂eh
> 0 incorporates the above intuition in the setting of the
sharing economy in a tractable way.
The second part of the utility function, Cj(ej), represents the cost of exerting effort. In
the analysis below, we adopt the widely-used quadratic functional form for the effort cost
function, i.e., Cj(ej) =
1
2
cje
2
j .
Finally, the third part of the utility function, ri, denotes the rating guest i receives from
the host, and rh,i denotes the rating host h receives from the guest. The term βj, which we
will refer to as the reputation weight, denotes how much agent j cares about this rating. On
Airbnb, the rating a guest receives affects her chance of being accepted by future hosts when
they apply for accommodation. Hosts care about ratings because ratings signal quality and
hence affect the expected demand of the listing. Here, we introduce the term βjrj in the
utility function as a simple and tractable device for comparing unilateral and bilateral rating
systems (see Section 3.2). However, even if we do not assume that βhrh enters host utility,
hosts still care about the ratings since guests infer that higher ratings imply higher quality,
and thus affect expected demand.
In our main analysis, we assume that agents truthfully report their utility of the accom-
modation experience in ratings, i.e.,
ri = vi + αhu(ei, eh) (5)
rh,i = vh + αiu(ei, eh). (6)
However, in Section 3.3, we relax this truth-telling assumption and show that our model is
robust to this assumption.
Lastly, we assume the vector of model parameters Γj ≡ [αj, βj, cj, vj] to be private infor-
mation of agent j prior to accommodation. However, the distribution of Γj, which we denote
by F (Γj), is assumed to be common knowledge.
Period 1: Pre-accommodation In period 1, the host posts the price P1, and the guests
decide whether to request accommodation. The transaction volume Q1 is determined at this
stage. The utility of the host is composed of two parts: the monetary revenue, P1Q1, and
the expected utility in period 2. The utility of the host in period 1 is given by:
Vh(P1) = P1Q1 +
ˆ
Uh(e
∗
h, ei, vi, rh,i)dF (Γi), (7)
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where Uh(e
∗
h, ei, vi, rh,i) is the ex-post utility the host obtains during the period 2. e
∗
h is the
optimal effort the host exerts during guest i's accommodation; ei is the equilibrium effort
exerted by guest i, vi is the objective value of guest i affecting the welfare of the host, and
rh,i is the rating the host receives from guest i.
In period 1, the early guests choose whether to make a booking request based on their
ex-ante expected utility. The ex-ante utility of guest i who chooses to enter the market is
given by:
Vi(P1) =
ˆ
Ui(e
∗
i , eh, vh, ri)dF (Γh)− P1, (8)
where Ui(e
∗
i , eh, vh, ri) is the ex-post utility of period 2. As before, the ex-post utility depends
on e∗i , the optimal effort exerted by guest i; eh, the equilibrium effort level exerted by the
host in the transaction with guest i, and ri, the rating guest i receives and vh.
3.2 Propositions
To simplify proofs, we assume that the shared experience utility takes the Cobb-Douglas
functional form, i.e.,
u(ei, eh) = e
k
i e
1−k
h , k ∈ (0, 1). (9)
However, our results hold under any non-separable form of u(ei, eh) satisfying the following
conditions:
∂2u(ei, eh)
∂ei∂eh
> 0,
∂u(ei, eh)
∂ei
> 0,
∂u(ei, eh)
∂eh
> 0. (10)
We solve the equilibrium by backward induction. In period 2, the host h and the guest
i choose their effort levels. At this stage, the uncertainty on the parameters is resolved, and
thus the optimization problem of the guest i and the host are given by:
max
ei
Ui(ei|eh, ri) = max
ei
{vh + αiu(ei, eh)− Ci(ei) + βiri} (11)
max
eh
Uh(eh|ei, rh,i) = max
eh
{vi + αhu(ei, eh)− Ch(eh) + βhrh,i}, (12)
where vh and vi are just exogenous variable and do not affect the optimization problem.
After invoking the truth-telling assumption, the first order conditions for the two opti-
mality problems are:
k(αi + βiβh)(
e∗i
e∗h
)k−1 − cie∗i = 0 (13)
(1− k)(αh + βhβi)( e
∗
i
e∗h,i
)k − che∗h = 0. (14)
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By the optimality conditions, we obtain the following closed-form solution for e∗i and e
∗
h:
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
γ(αi + βiαh)
1−γ (15)
e∗h = B(αh + βhαi)
µ(αi + βiαh)
1−µ, (16)
where γ ≡ 1−k
2
and µ ≡ 1− k
2
; A ≡ ( k
ci
)1−γ(1−k
ch
)γ and B ≡ ( k
ci
)1−µ(1−k
ch
)µ.
We then present three propositions, which we explain intuitively leaving formal proofs
for Appendix A.
Proposition 1. A host's average rating on Airbnb positively depends on the host's reciprocity
weight αh, i.e., letting Rairbnb ≡
´
rh,idi denote the average rating of host h we have
∂Rairbnb
∂αh
> 0, ∀αh > 0. (17)
Intuitively, Proposition 1 captures the following process: a host with higher reciprocity
weight αh is, on average, more willing to improve the shared experience by exerting effort.
Because of reciprocity, her guests are willing to exert more effort themselves. Ultimately, the
increased effort level of both agents increases the shared experience utility, which is reflected
in higher ratings that guests leave for the host.
Formally, from Equations 15 and 16, we have:
∂e∗h
∂αh
> 0 (18)
∂e∗i
∂αh
> 0. (19)
The above inequalities show that the equilibrium effort levels of the host and the guest
increase with the host's weight on reciprocity. In turn, increased effort increases the shared
experience utility u(ei, eh). Finally, the higher level of u(ei, eh) is reflected in the higher
rating left by the guest i to for the host h, which leads to a higher average rating for the
host.
In the next proposition, we show that Airbnb's bilateral reputation system reveals more
information about hosts' reciprocity weights than a unilateral reputation system (where hosts
do not rate their guests.) For instance, one consequence of this proposition is that bilateral
ratings are more informative than unilateral ratings about host attributes like hospitality.
Thus, to the extent that platforms like Airbnb want to encourage reciprocal behavior, the
bilateral rating system is a better choice.
Proposition 2. Let Rairbnb ≡
´
i
rairh,i di denote the average rating of a host on Airbnb's
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bilateral reputation system, and Runi ≡
´
i
runih,i di denote the average rating of the same host
on a unilateral reputation system. Then we have
∂Rairbnb
∂αh
>
∂Runi
∂αh
> 0, (20)
∂Runi
∂βh
>
∂Rairbnb
∂βh
> 0. (21)
The proposition above states that ratings on both reputation systems respond positively
to the reciprocity and reputation weights, αh and βh respectively. However, for the same
host and guests, the reciprocity weight plays a bigger role in the bilateral rating system,
while the reputation weight plays a bigger role on the unilateral system. Next, we illustrate
the intuitive reasoning behind this proposition.
We begin with inequality 20, which quantifies the impact of the reciprocity weight, αh.
From Proposition 1, we know that ∂Rairbnb
∂αh
> 0. It is straightforward to show that ∂Runi
∂αh
> 0
also holds, since inequalities 18 and 19 hold independently of the design of the reputation
system. Thus, increased reciprocity weights leads to increased effort levels, which lead to
increased ratings.
Next we show that ratings in the bilateral reputation system are more sensitive to reci-
procity weight than ratings in a unilateral reputation system, i.e., ∂Rairbnb
∂αh
> ∂Runi
∂αh
. We
decompose the explanation in two steps. First, we show that for the same host h, guest
i exerts less effort under the unilateral reputation system. Second, we demonstrate that,
if two hosts who transact with the same guest only differ in their reciprocity weights, the
higher the guest's effort is, the larger the effort difference between the two hosts.
The first step is intuitively explained by the fact that the bilateral reputation system
introduces reputation concerns for the guest i. Therefore, under a bilateral system, guest i
exerts more effort.
We then show that a guest's effort positively affects the effort difference between two
hosts transacting with her using an example. Assume two hosts, Ann and Bob. Ann has
higher reciprocity weight than Bob, i.e., αAnn > αBob. From the first order condition of
the host's optimality problem, we have that, given the same level of ei, eAnn(ei) > eBob(ei).
This means that Ann exerts more effort than Bob if they transact with the same guest i.
Moreover, because Ann has higher reciprocity weight, when guest i increases her effort, Ann
is more willing to reciprocate, i.e., the difference eAnn(ei)− eBob(ei) increases in ei. Finally,
since the shared experience utility, u(ei, eh), depends positively on eh, the larger difference
between the effort of Ann and Bob translates to a larger difference in the shared experience
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utility, which is then revealed in the rating difference between Ann and Bob.3
Our last proposition establishes the positive relationship between the price and ratings.
Proposition 3. On Airbnb, prices increase after a positive ratings shock, and decrease after
a negative shock. Given the same price P1 at period 1, we have the following relationship for
prices posted at period 3 and ratings Rairbnb and R
′
airbnb disclosed in period 2,
if Rairbnb > R
′
airbnb then P3(Rairbnb) > P3(R
′
airbnb). (22)
Proposition 3 shows that prices respond to ratings. This results from the informativeness
of the ratings: a host with higher average rating will look more attractive to future guests,
and therefore will have higher expected demand than another host with the same price but
lower average rating. Since period 3 price is determined by expected demand, hosts with
higher average rating will raise their prices.
The propositions above lead to the following two claims:
Claim 1. Hosts with higher reciprocity weights have higher average ratings.
Claim 2. For a given set of hosts, the one with higher reciprocity weight and lower reputation
weight is ranked higher on Airbnb than her counterpart with lower reciprocity weight and
higher reputation weight, while the opposite is true on the unilateral reputation system.
3.3 Relaxing the truth-telling assumption
Next, we relax the truth-telling assumption, allowing selection bias and rating inflation, as
observed in Fradkin et al. (2017). Again, we present the main intuition for why our results
hold under these relaxed assumptions, providing detailed proofs in Appendix A.4.
Under this assumption, the rating given to a host, denoted by rh,i, is a choice variable of
the guests, which means that guests do not automatically report their utility in the ratings
they leave for their hosts. Instead, guests can choose not to report a rating at all, report a
rating not equal to their utility, or truthfully report their utility in the rating.
Formally stated, let ωi(ei, eh, vh) ≡ vh+αhu(ei, eh) be the total utility that guest i obtains
from the accommodation. Let φ denote the mapping from the guest's utility to ratings, i.e.,
φ : Ω → R, where Ω and R denote full set of ωi and full set of rh,i. In this general setup,
not disclosing ratings due to selection bias is modeled as φ(ωi) = 0, for some ωi. Meanwhile,
when the guests choose what rating to report, we allow guests to inflate their ratings, i.e.,
3Following a similar reasoning, we can show that the ratings on both systems positively relate to the
host's weight on reputation, and that the unilateral review system responds more to the reputation weight,
βh.
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φ(ωi) > ωi. Also, we assume φ to be a weakly increasing function of ωi. This assumption
rules out φ(ωi) being constant or decreasing over ωi.
4 These two cases are unrealistic since
they contradict the empirical observation that Airbnb ratings are informative about listing
quality (Fradkin et al., 2017).
Under this extended model, our main result, namely that ratings reveal the reciprocity
weight, still holds. The sketch of the proof follows. Formally, since rh,i = φ(ωi) ≡ φ(vh +
u(ei, eh)) and φ is weakly increasing, rh,i still increases with αh. Thus, the average rating of
the host, also increases with αh. Therefore, even when we allow for selection bias and rating
inflation, the ratings reflect, to some extent, the accommodation experience under weak
assumptions on rating informativeness.5 Finally, since the guest's accommodation experience
is determined by the host's reciprocity weight, the guest's rating about the accommodation
still reveals the host's reciprocity weight.
4 Airbnb and data
4.1 Airbnb
We use data from Airbnb to motivate our model and test its predictions. Airbnb, which
launched in 2008, is a peer-to-peer marketplace for short term accommodation rentals.
Airbnb hosts offer private or shared accommodation for rent to prospective guests. The
Airbnb marketplace has seen a dramatic growth over the last few years. At the beginning
of 2016 the platform listed approximately 3 million properties from 640,000 hosts in over
150,000 cities and 52 countries.6 Over 80 million guests have used Airbnb, and with a market
valuation of $30B, Airbnb is one of the world's largest accommodation brands.7
To build trust among users, Airbnb uses a bilateral reputation system. Hosts and guests
can optionally review each other. The text of these reviews is publicly disclosed but their
star-ratings are not. Instead, Airbnb only discloses average ratings aggregated across at
multiple reviews. Prior to July 2014, Airbnb users had the option of reviewing each other
within a 30-day window following the conclusion of each stay. During this 30-day window,
reviews were revealed as they were submitted. This sequential revelation mechanism allowed
4φ(ωi) decreasing with ωi implies that guests give hosts providing worse service strictly higher ratings.
φ(ωi) constant over ωi implies guests give all hosts the same rating regardless of quality.
5For example, a guest may choose not to disclose her rating after a bad experience. However, a guest
does not rate a bad experience better than a good one. Therefore, the rating a guest discloses still weakly
reveals the quality of her experience.
6See: http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/airbnb-statistics/
7See http://qz.com/329735/airbnb-will-soon-be-booking-more-rooms-than-the-worlds-
largest-hotel-chains/
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for retaliatory reviewing: the second reviewer could punish the first reviewer by submitting
a negative review in exchange for receiving a negative review (Fradkin et al., 2017). In July
2014 Airbnb made a major change to its reputation system by shortening the review window
to 14 days and only revealing reviews simultaneously after the review submission deadline. In
doing so, Airbnb lessened the possibility of retaliatory reviewing.8 To reduce the possibility
of analyzing ratings that are biased by retaliatory reviewing, we limit our dataset to hosts
that entered the Airbnb marketplace from July 2014 onwards.
4.2 Data
We compile a novel dataset of Airbnb listing entry, exit, prices, supply, demand, and reviews.
Our dataset is a weekly panel of U.S. Airbnb listings spanning a 17-month period from the
beginning of July 2014 to the end of November 2015. During this timeframe, we collected
information on all US listings and their hosts from the Airbnb website with weekly frequency.
The final panel contains 3, 295, 188 listing-week observations for 198, 743 distinct listings
and 137, 687 distinct hosts, whose accounts were created on or after July 1, 2014. For each
listing, we observe various characteristics including location, listing type (e.g., apartment,
house, etc.), bed type, number of listing photos, price, star-rating, and number of reviews.
Additionally, for each host, we observe reviews left and received, and the number of properties
listed by the host on Airbnb.
Airbnb allows hosts to select which days of the year their listings are available for rent
without the need to add or remove the listing from the platform. To do so, hosts use a
calendar, on which they mark available days and set prices. In addition, Airbnb hosts can
make their listings instantly bookable, forgoing the opportunity to reject certain guests. We
collected calendar information (whether a listing was available for booking, booked, or busy)
between September 2014 to September 2015.
Given this data, we define market participation as the fraction of days a property was
listed for rent (regardless of whether a day was eventually booked or not) during our ob-
servation period. The final dataset contains market participation information for 101, 596
listings and 74, 909 hosts. Out of these listings, 51, 697 have a star-rating (Airbnb only as-
signs a star-rating to listings with at least three reviews.) Figure 1 displays the distribution
of star-ratings for the subset of listings for which we know both their market participation
and star-rating. As in previous work (Fradkin et al., 2017; Zervas et al., 2015), we find that
most of the listings (91.6%) have a star-rating of at least 4.5-stars. In Figure 2, we plot the
probability density function of market participation for the same subset of listings, and find
8See: http://blog.airbnb.com/building-trust-new-review-system/
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that, on average, a listing is listed on the platform 85% of the time.
For every listing in our data, we have on average 16 weekly observations. Listings may
have fewer or more weekly observations due to entry and exit. The average listing price
is $229, the average number of reviews hosts received from guests is 4.5, and the average
star-rating of these reviews is 4.7. On average, hosts write reviews that are shorter than
the reviews they receive from guests. Hosts in our data received reviews with an average
length of 351 characters, and left reviews 151 characters long. Finally, by November 2015,
the instantly bookable feature is enabled for 30, 767 listings.
5 Evidence of Reciprocity on Airbnb
In this section, we use data from the Airbnb platform to provide empirical evidence for the
predictions of our model. Our model makes two key predictions. First, hosts that are more
reciprocal should have higher ratings. Seconds, higher rated hosts  which includes hosts
that are more reciprocal  should be able to charge higher prices.
5.1 The relationship between reciprocity and ratings
Proposition 1 of our model states that a host's ratings on Airbnb are positively related to
the host's reciprocity weight, αh. In other words, hosts who are more reciprocal should
have higher ratings. To test this prediction we need to know hosts' reciprocity weights, ah.
However, reciprocity is not directly observable. Instead, we attempt to find proxies in our
data that are correlated with reciprocal behavior.
Our first (and preferred) proxy for reciprocity weight is whether the host writes long
reviews about her guests. Intuitively, a host that cares more about the overall Airbnb
experience will take more time to describe this experience in a review. Note that, as explained
in Section 4, Airbnb employs a double-blind review mechanism in which the content (and
length) of the host's review is not disclosed to the guest until either the guest submits her
own review or 14 days have passed. Therefore, this proxy cannot have a direct impact on
guest ratings (e.g., a good review from the host to the guest cannot incentivize a good review
from the same guest to the host.) Further, the reviews that hosts leave for guests are not
displayed on the hosts' Airbnb pages and, therefore, hosts have little incentive to behave
strategically with respect to reviews they leave for their guests.9 Therefore, we hypothesize
9To read reviews a host left for past guests one has to: a) find out who the past guests were by looking
at the host profile and checking which guests left a review for the host, b) look up the Airbnb profiles of
each of these guests, and c) manually scan each guest profile to locate a review left for the guest by the host
in question. We assume that the vast majority of Airbnb users do not engage in this behavior.
15
that hosts that leave longer reviews about their guests are more likely to have a higher
reciprocity weight.
The second proxy we use is whether the host has activated the Instant Book feature.
Similar to hotel reservations, reservation requests for instantly bookable Airbnb listings do
not require explicit host approval. We hypothesize that hosts using the Instant Book feature
have more weight on the reputation utility rj than on the shared experience utility u(ei, eh).
We test our hypotheses using the following model:
Star-ratingi = β1 log Host-to-Guest Review Lengthi (23)
+ β2 Not Instant Bookablei + Xiγ + i,
where the dependent variable is the star-rating of host i. log Host-to-Guest Review Lengthi
and Not Instant Bookablei, whose coefficients are of interest, are the average (log of the)
length of the reviews written to her guests, and whether the host listing is not instantly
bookable, respectively. In Xi we include a wide set of controls that can affect the host
star-rating. We report the estimates of this regression in Table 1. In the first column, we
present our results without any controls. We find that the coefficients of interest are both
positive and significant, suggesting that hosts that write longer reviews and hosts that do
not use the Instant Book feature have, on average, higher ratings. In the second column, we
include a wide array of controls and show that the coefficients are similar to our previous
estimates. These results are consistent our hypothesis that more reciprocal hosts have, on
average, higher ratings.
5.2 The relationship between ratings and prices
Next, we provide evidence for Proposition 3, which states that listing prices should increase
after a positive shock on ratings and decrease after a negative shock on ratings.
Estimating the causal impact of ratings on prices is difficult because unobserved changes
in listing quality can simultaneously affect both prices and ratings. For example, consider a
host that invests in quality (e.g., upgrades the bed, or installs a new air conditioner.) At the
same time, since the listing's quality has improved, the host also raises the listing's price.
In this case, a regression of ratings on prices will lead us to mistakenly attribute increased
prices to the increase in ratings, when it is in fact driven by unobserved (to us) changes in
listing quality.
To overcome this challenge, our identification strategy exploits a unique characteristic of
the Airbnb platform: a listing's average rating is only disclosed after the listing accumulates
three reviews. Airbnb does not disclose individual review ratings, therefore listing quality
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can be inferred only by reading the review content until the listing average rating is disclosed.
This provides us with a natural experiment to test hosts' reaction to the disclosure of their
average rating.
Relying on rating disclosures alone is not sufficient to test the relationship between ratings
and prices because unobserved changes to listing quality can happen around rating disclosure.
Convincingly controlling for quality changes is difficult especially because Airbnb does not
disclose the individual ratings associated with reviews. To minimize endogeneity concerns
due to unobserved quality changes correlated with the timing of ratings disclose, we focus on
listings whose ratings (which are a proxy for quality) up to and including the third review
(when the rating disclosure occurs) are constant.
Despite the fact that listing ratings are not disclosed prior to the third review, we know
that for a listing to obtain an average of 5 stars at the time of disclosure, the listing must have
received three 5-stars reviews (Airbnb rounds ratings to the nearest half-star, and the only
set of three ratings that results in a rounded 5 stars rating is a set of three 5-stars reviews.)
Therefore, to implement our identification strategy we limit our data to the subset of listings
for which the disclosed rounded average rating after three reviews is 5 stars. Moreover, since
we are interested in the immediate effect of rating disclosure on prices, we only consider
listing prices up to and including the third review. Thus, the treatment effect we estimate
is the average difference in prices between the period when a listing has between zero and
two reviews (the pre-disclosure period), and the period when listings has exactly 3 reviews
(the disclosure period.)
In addition to limiting our analysis to listings with constant ratings, we further control
for changes in quality using a number of time-varying listing characteristics.
The following model implements our identification strategy:
log Priceit = βDit + γXit + αi + τt + it. (24)
The dependent variable is the log of the price of listing i in year-week t. Dit, whose coefficient
is of interest, is an indicator of whether the average rating of listing i has been disclosed at
time t. In Xit we include a set of time-varying controls to further account for changes in
listing quality. Further, we include listing (αi) and year-week (τt) fixed effects, to control for
unobserved time invariant listing characteristics and shocks to prices common across listings,
e.g., prices are higher during holiday seasons. Finally, to account for serial correlation in our
dependent variable, we cluster standard errors at the listing level.
We present the results of this analysis in Table 2. In the first column, we report estimates
from a minimum specification without any controls. The coefficient of interest, β, is positive
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and statistically significant (p < 0.01). Our estimates suggest that a 5-star average rating
disclosure leads to a 1.6% increase in the listing price.
Next, we test the robustness of our results by including a set of time-varying observable
listing characteristics that can potentially affect listing quality and thus both ratings and
price. Specifically, we control the number of pictures associated with each listing, the type
of cancellation policy, the number of Airbnb listings in the same ZIP code, and several
other observable listing attributes that can vary over time. We report the estimates of this
specification in the second column of Table 2. The coefficient of interest is positive and
similar in magnitude to our previous estimate.
Overall, the empirical evidence provided in this section is consistent with the predictions
made in our analytical framework: hosts with higher reciprocity weights have higher ratings.
Further, listing prices respond to changes in reputation, implying that Airbnb ratings are
informative. Taken together, these findings suggest that hosts who are more reciprocal can
charge higher prices.
5.3 Why do casual hosts have higher ratings than professionals?
We conclude our analysis by presenting a novel empirical observation, and showing how
reciprocity can help explain it. Specifically, we show that professional Airbnb hosts have lower
ratings than casual hosts. Because ratings are informative about listing quality (Fradkin
et al., 2017), it would appear that professional hosts offer lower quality. We argue this
pattern can be explained by reciprocity.
We begin by characterizing hosts by how often they participate in the market. Specifically,
we define market participation as the fraction of days over the entire year hosts list their
property for rent. This quantity is intended to capture the willingness of hosts to participate
in the market, and it is not the same as listing occupancy rate, which is the fraction of
booked nights over available nights and is a measure of demand. While market participation
is a continuous measure, for convenience we will refer to hosts with relatively high market
participation as professional hosts and those with relatively low market participation as
casual hosts.
We demonstrate that casual hosts have higher ratings than professional hosts by regress-
ing the star-rating of Airbnb listings on market participation. We report this analysis in the
first column of Table 3. We find that increased market participation is significantly associ-
ated with lower ratings  roughly, a unit increase in average rating predicts one percentage
point decrease in market participation. In column 2, we repeat the same analysis including a
large set of controls that could affect rating. For example, we include proxies for face-to-face
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interaction such as whether a listing is a private accommodation and whether the host has
more than one property listed (Fradkin et al., 2017). We also include review counts and time
trends to allow for the possibility that the ratings of professional hosts decay faster because
they serve a wider selection of guests, akin to the findings of (Godes and Silva, 2012). We
obtain similar results.
These results suggest that professional hosts, on average, have lower rating than casual
hosts. Next, we show that this difference in ratings could be due to different reciprocity
preferences. Specifically, we test whether the reciprocity proxies described in Section 5.1 are
negatively correlated with market participation by estimating the following model:
Market Participationi = β1 log Host-to-Guest Review Lengthi (25)
+ β2 Not Instant Bookablei + Xiγ + i,
where the dependent variable is the market participation of listing i and the coefficients of
interest β1 and β2 correspond to our two reciprocity weight proxies. In Xi we include a set of
controls that could be potentially correlated with the dependent variable, while at the same
time affecting the host-to-guest review length and the host decision to activate the instantly
bookable feature.
We report our results in Table 4. In the first column, we present the results without
including any controls. The estimated coefficients are in line with our hypothesis: longer
reviews and not being instantly bookable are negatively correlated with market participation.
In the second column, we incorporate a wide set of controls. In both cases, we find a negative
relationship between our reciprocity proxies and market participation.
Overall, these results suggest that casual hosts are more reciprocal, which could explain
their higher ratings.
6 Alternative explanations
Our analytical model of reciprocity can explain the rating patterns observed on Airbnb,
including the fact that casual hosts have higher ratings than professional hosts. However,
reciprocity is not the only way to explain this phenomenon. In this section, we discuss various
plausible alternative models and explain why we believe that these alternative models do
not easily fit the patterns we observe in our data. Specifically, we show that allowing for
biased ratings, risk aversion, endogenous quality, or altruistic behavior cannot easily explain
the observation that casual hosts have higher ratings than professional hosts. We discuss
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the intuition behind these alternative models next, and we refer the reader to Appendix B
for a formal analysis.
Exogenous service quality We start by considering a simple model where service quality
is private information of the host, and guests infer quality from publicly available ratings.
Quality is exogenously given and fixed across transactions. We assume a monopoly host who
maximizes expected profits by choosing prices. All players report their true utility in their
ratings. Under this model, for casual hosts to have higher ratings than professional hosts,
we need to assume that market participation and service quality are negatively correlated.
While in principle this relationship could hold, in practice we should expect professional
hosts to strive to maintain higher ratings than casual hosts because they are more reliant on
Airbnb revenue.
Relaxing the truth-telling assumption So far we have assumed that players truth-
fully report ratings. However, on many peer-to-peer platforms negative ratings are under-
reported (Fradkin et al., 2017; Dellarocas and Wood, 2008). We can extend our model to
allow for selection in reporting ratings, and show that this extension does not help to ex-
plain the observed patterns. Under selection, guests incur a cost associated with giving low
ratings, and hence, only high ratings are reported. In this variant of the simple model, to
explain that casual hosts have higher ratings than professional hosts we need to assume that
the former are more likely to interact with guests who face higher costs from leaving low
ratings. This assumption would drastically reduce the informativeness of ratings, contrary
to findings in the literature (Fradkin et al., 2017) and what we see in our data.
Relaxing the risk neutral assumption As a final attempt to use the simple model
to explain the empirical facts, we relax the risk neutrality assumption and assume that
the guests behavior affects the host's welfare. We still assume that the service quality is
exogenously given and guests truthfully report their utility in their ratings. In this model,
the risk aversion towards misconduct of the guests induces the host to increase her price
and lower the transaction volume. However, since the host cannot endogenously choose the
service effort, the higher ratings of casual hosts are indicative of their better service quality.
This means that to explain that casual hosts have higher ratings than professionals, we still
need to assume that casual hosts have exogenously higher service quality than professional
hosts.
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Endogenous service quality So far, we argued that under the exogenous quality assump-
tion it is difficult to explain why professional hosts have lower ratings. Next, we assume that
service quality  the effort exerted by the host in each transaction  is endogenously cho-
sen, and can vary between transactions. In this model, guests report the host's effort in
their ratings. Therefore, since future guests infer the host's service quality from prior rat-
ings, higher ratings generate higher expected demand. Thus, ratings incentivize hosts to
exert effort. Because professional hosts should rely more heavily on Airbnb revenue than
casual hosts, they should also have stronger incentives to exert higher levels of effort. This,
would result in higher ratings for professional hosts, contradicting our empirical observations.
The models we have considered so far suggest that when reputation is the sole incentive for
exerting effort, it is difficult to explain the fact that professional hosts have lower ratings.
Introducing interdependent preferences As a final attempt to explain the observed
rating patterns without introducing reciprocity, we allow the host to have interdependent
preferences, i.e., the utility of guest i, denoted as Ui, enters into the host's utility function.
This approach is similar to the one used in our analytical framework, but in this case we
do not allow hosts and guests to be reciprocal. Under interdependent preferences, casual
hosts have higher ratings than professional hosts if casual hosts have a higher weight on
the guests' welfare than professional hosts. In other words, casual hosts would have to
be more altruistic than professional hosts. While in principle this could be true, we claim
that altruistic behavior on Airbnb, which requires that a host behaves well independently
of a guest's behavior, is a stronger assumption than reciprocity, which requires that a host
behaves well in response to a guest's good behavior.
7 Conclusion
Two salient characteristics of the sharing economy make these marketplaces unique and
interesting to study. First, during a transaction, buyers and sellers are likely to interact
closely. Second, because transactions are between peers rather than firms and customers,
sellers have a much lower market power than they do in traditional markets. Because of these
characteristics, the behavior of buyers and sellers in peer-to-peer markets can be substantially
different from traditional marketplaces.
In this paper, we develop an analytical framework that, by introducing reciprocity 
the tendency to increase effort in response to others' increased effort  can explain how
buyers and sellers interact in these marketplaces. We show that reciprocity can improve the
welfare of reciprocal peers, who can obtain higher ratings and charge higher prices. We test
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the key predictions of our analytical framework using data collected from Airbnb, a popular
peer-to-peer rental accommodation website.
We contribute to the existing literature on peer-to-peer markets by deepening our un-
derstanding of how trust is generated in these marketplaces. Specifically, we provide four
insights.
First, we show that reciprocity is likely to arise in peer-to-peer platforms such as Airbnb.
This is important because reciprocity can informally regulate players' behavior and promote
cooperation. Because of this, more reciprocal sellers (and buyers) are rewarded with higher
ratings.
Second, our theory predicts that ratings on bilateral reputation systems are more respon-
sive to reciprocity than unilateral reputation systems (while unilateral reputation systems
are more responsive to reputation concerns than bilateral reputation systems.) This means
that being reciprocal is a behavior that is rewarded more in bilateral reputation systems than
unilateral ones. Thus, in contrast to the existing literature that has primarily focused on
the shortcomings of bilateral reputation systems, our work highlights an important practical
advantage of allowing reviews from both sides of the market. This may explain the choice
of bilateral reputation systems by platforms such as Airbnb and Uber.
Third, we show that reciprocity indirectly affects equilibrium prices by affecting rat-
ings. Because ratings are informative about seller quality, by earning higher ratings, more
reciprocal sellers are able to charge higher prices.
Fourth, our findings have implications for market design. A good matching mechanism
that matches reciprocal hosts and guests can induce positive reciprocity which, in turn,
increases the welfare of both hosts and guests. By contrast, a poor matching mechanism
may trigger negative reciprocity and decrease welfare. Our work suggests that reciprocity
preferences should be considered among other matching criteria. While reciprocity is difficult
to measure outside experimental settings, the reciprocity proxies we develop in this paper,
such as the host-to-guest review length, offer a starting point.
Overall, our paper represents a first step towards understanding the drivers of peer be-
havior in the sharing economy by combining a theoretical model incorporating reciprocity
with data from an established peer-to-peer marketplace.
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Table 1: Correlation between host star-rating and reciprocity weight
proxies.
(1) (2)
log Host-to-Guest Review Length 0.144*** 0.123***
(0.003) (0.003)
Not Instant Bookable 0.030*** 0.047***
(0.004) (0.004)
Private Accommodation −0.006
(0.004)
Host Has 2+ Listings −0.019***
(0.003)
log Price 0.048***
(0.003)
log Reviews 0.048***
(0.002)
Number of Bedrooms 0.007**
(0.003)
Number of Beds −0.003
(0.002)
Number of Bathrooms 0.026***
(0.003)
log Minimum Booking Nights 0.002
(0.003)
log Number of Photos 0.033***
(0.003)
Has Complete Description 0.029***
(0.003)
Person Capacity −0.007***
(0.002)
Number of Guests Included −0.002*
(0.001)
log Extra Guest Price −0.003***
(0.001)
Is Superhost 0.217***
(0.006)
Host Subscribed Since (Months) 0.007***
(0.000)
N 59868 59868
R2adj. 0.051 0.093
Note: The dependent variable is the average star-rating of host i. Robust stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2: The impact of rating disclosure on listing price.
(1) (2)
Rating Disclosed 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
log Reviews 0.002
(0.002)
log Number of Photos −0.008*
(0.004)
log Extra Guest Price −0.004**
(0.002)
Number of Guests Included 0.009***
(0.003)
Is Instant Bookable −0.021***
(0.003)
log Minimum Booking Nights 0.011*
(0.006)
log Airbnb Zipcode Supply 0.003
(0.006)
Cancellation Policy Dummy No Yes
Bed Type Dummy No Yes
N 352281 352281
R2 within 0.0044 0.0090
Note: The dependent variable is the (log) price of listing i at time t.
All the models include year-week and listing fixed effects. Cluster-
robust standard errors (at the individual listing level) are shown in
parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Correlation between listing star-rating and market partic-
ipation.
(1) (2)
Market participation −0.081*** −0.092***
(0.007) (0.007)
Private Accommodation −0.033***
(0.005)
Host Has 2+ Listings −0.047***
(0.004)
log Price 0.072***
(0.004)
log Reviews 0.045***
(0.002)
Number of Bedrooms 0.005*
(0.003)
Number of Beds −0.002
(0.002)
Number of Bathrooms 0.024***
(0.003)
Not Instant Bookable 0.056***
(0.004)
log Minimum Booking Nights 0.016***
(0.003)
log Number of Photos 0.053***
(0.003)
Has Complete Description 0.058***
(0.003)
Person Capacity −0.011***
(0.002)
Number of Guests Included 0.001
(0.001)
log Extra Guest Price −0.001
(0.001)
Is Superhost 0.249***
(0.006)
Host Subscribed Since (Months) 0.005***
(0.000)
Cancellation Policy Dummy No Yes
Bed Type Dummy No Yes
N 51697 51697
R2adj. 0.0028 0.081
Note: The dependent variable is the average star-rating of listing j. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 4: Correlation between host market participation and reci-
procity proxies.
(1) (2)
log Host-to-Guest Review Length −0.006*** −0.016***
(0.002) (0.002)
Not Instant Bookable −0.063*** −0.036***
(0.003) (0.003)
Private Accommodation −0.084***
(0.003)
Host Has 2+ Listings 0.047***
(0.003)
log Price −0.016***
(0.003)
log Reviews 0.053***
(0.002)
Number of Bedrooms −0.010***
(0.002)
Number of Beds 0.001
(0.001)
Number of Bathrooms 0.008***
(0.003)
log Minimum Booking Nights −0.029***
(0.002)
log Number of Photos 0.019***
(0.002)
Has Complete Description −0.003
(0.003)
Person Capacity 0.002**
(0.001)
Number of Guests Included 0.003***
(0.001)
log Extra Guest Price 0.007***
(0.001)
Is Superhost −0.042***
(0.006)
Host Subscribed Since (Months) −0.004***
(0.000)
Has Star Rating 0.195***
(0.018)
Has Star Rating × Star Rating −0.035***
(0.004)
N 52966 52966
R2adj. 0.0068 0.11
Note: The dependent variable is the market participation of host i. Robust stan-
dard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proposition 1. The host's average rating on Airbnb is positively related to her reciprocity
weight, i.e., ∀αi ≥ 0 and αi 6= 0,
∂Rairbnb
∂αh
> 0 (26)
where
Rairbnb ≡
ˆ
i
rh,i(eh, ei)di (27)
is the average rating of the host.
Proof : We solve the subgame equilibrium at Period 2. Note that at Period 2, both players
choose their optimal effort level as best response to the other's effort. Then each player
reports their utility of accommodation in the rating.
Plugging rh,i(ei, eh) = vh + αiu(ei, eh) and ri(ei, eh) = vi + αhu(ei, eh) into the ex-post
utility of host and guest i, we have
Ui(ei|eh) = max
ei
{vh + αiu(ei, eh)− P − C(ei) + βi[vi + αhu(ei, eh)]} (28)
Uh(eh|ei) = max
eh
{vi + αhu(ei, eh) + βh[vh + αiu(ei, eh)]} (29)
Combining the first order conditions of the two optimality problems, we have
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
1−k
2 (αi + βiαh)
1+k
2
e∗h = B(αh + βhαi)
1− k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2
where A ≡ ( k
ci
)
1−k
2 (1−k
ch
)
1+k
2 and B ≡ ( k
ci
)1−
k
2 (1−k
ch
)
k
2 .
Thus,
rh,i(ei,eh) = vh + αie
k
i e
1−k
h (30)
= vh + αi[A(αh + βhαi)
1−k
2 (αi + βiαh)
1+k
2 ]k[B(αh + βhαi)
1− k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2 ]1−k.
From the above, we have
∂rh,i
∂αh
> 0 (31)
and since Rairbnb ≡
´
rh,idi
∂Rairbnb
∂αh
> 0. (32)
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A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proposition 4.2. The ratings on both review systems depend positively on the weights of
reciprocity and reputation, αh and βh. However, given the same pool of guests, the host's
average rating on Airbnb responds more to the reciprocity weight, while the rating on the
unilateral review system responds more to reputation weight, i.e,
∂Rairbnb
∂αh
>
∂Runi
∂αh
> 0 and
∂Runi
∂βh
>
∂Rairbnb
∂βh
> 0. (33)
where Rairbnb ≡
´
i
rairh,i (eh, ei)di is the host's average rating on Airbnb, and Runi ≡´
i
runih,i (eh, ei)di is the host's average rating on an unilateral review system.
Proof : From previous results, we have
e∗i = A(αh + βhαi)
1−k
2 (αi + βiαh)
1+k
2
e∗h = B(αh + βhαi)
1− k
2 (αi + βiαh)
k
2 .
For the same host and the same guests pool on both the unilateral review system platform
and Airbnb, and given identical values of the parameters, except βi = 0 under the unilateral
review system, we have
∂rairh,i
∂αh
>
∂runih,i
∂αh
> 0 (34)
0 <
∂rairh,i
∂βh
<
∂runih,i
∂βh
. (35)
Since Rairbnb ≡
´
i
rairh,i (eh, ei)di and Runi ≡
´
i
runih,i (eh, ei)di, we have
∂Rairbnb
∂αh
>
∂Runi
∂αh
> 0 and
∂Runi
∂βh
>
∂Rairbnb
∂βh
> 0. (36)
Thus, under a unilateral reputation system, hosts that care more about reputation are ranked
higher than hosts that care more about the shared experience utility. The opposite is true
on bilateral reputation systems like Airbnb.10
10An alternative and equivalent way to prove proposition 2 would be to remove the term βiri from the
ex-post utility of guest i in equations 11 and then solve the optimization problem.
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A.3 Proof of proposition 3
Proposition 3. On Airbnb, prices increase after a positive shock on ratings, and decrease
after a negative shock on ratings. Given the same price P1 at period 1, and ratings Rairbnb
and R′airbnb disclosed at period 2, we have the following relationship for prices posted at period
3,
if Rairbnb > R
′
airbnb then P3(Rairbnb) > P3(R
′
airbnb). (37)
Proof : Ex-ante, guests determine whether to enter the market according to Vi(P ). Guest i
enters the market if and only if Vi(P ) ≥ 0, given P . Therefore, the marginal guest is guest
i∗ where Vi∗(P ) = 0. For each guest i at period 3, the expected utility Vi(P ) is positively
determined by her inference of αh, βh.
From previous results, we have ∂u(ei,eh)
∂αh
> 0 and ∂u(ei,eh)
∂βh
> 0. Together with ri =
vi + αhu(ei, eh), we have
∂ri
∂αh
> 0 (38)
∂ri
∂βh
> 0 (39)
Then, since Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh) = vh + αiu(ei, eh) + βiri, we have that ∀(αi, βi) > 0,
∂Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh)
∂αh
> 0 (40)
∂Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh)
∂βh
> 0, (41)
where u(ei, eh) is the shared experience utility and Ui(ei, eh, ri) is ex-post utility of guest i
during the accommodation stay.
At period 3, Vi(P3) is the ex-ante utility of the guest i if she decides to transact with the
host. The guest i forms her expectation based on the publicly observed price, P3, and the
average rating of the host, Rh ≡
´
rh,jdj, i.e.,
Vi(P ) =
ˆ
Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh)dF
updated(Ψh), (42)
where F updated(Ψh) is the posterior distribution of the host's characteristic parameter vector
(αh, βh, vh). The Bayesian-updated guests update the prior distribution F (Ψh) upon the
signal Rh to derive F
updated(Ψh) .
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From Equations 40, 41, and 42, we have that ∀(αh, βh, vh) ∈ Ψh, the expected value of
Ui(ei, eh, ri, vh) are positively related to αh and βh, i.e.,
∂Vi(P3)
∂αh
> 0 (43)
∂Vi(P3)
∂βh
> 0 (44)
The two conditions above imply that the ex-ante utility to transact is higher if the host is
perceived to have higher weight on shared experience or reputation respectively.
Meanwhile, from previous results we have
∂rh,i
∂αh
> 0 (45)
∂rh,i
∂βh
> 0 (46)
Conditions 45 and 46 show that the hosts with higher value of αh and βh have higher rating
rh,i given the same guest i. Then, from Rh ≡
´
rh,idi, we have that, given the same guests
pool, the average rating, Rh, reveals higher value of (αh, βh).
Suppose that two hosts are identical, except for their ratings, i.e., they have the same price
P1, same location, and similar property, but Rairbnb > R
′
airbnb. Then the higher rating Rairbnb
is a positive signal relative to R′airbnb, i.e., the expected value of the host's characteristics
is better for the host with Rairbnb. Thus, if the two hosts post identical P3, the expected
demand towards the host with higher average ratings would be higher, i.e., Q(P3, Rairbnb) >
Q(P3, R
′
airbnb).
Since each period-3 guest is more willing to transact with a host having Rairbnb than with
a host having R′airbnb, the host with higher rating posts higher price P3 in this monopolistic
pricing setting (assuming that the hosts are faced with the same pool of guests).
Formally, let's suppose P1 and Q1 are the same for Host A and Host B, and, without loss
of generality, assume the mass of guests enter the market have the same set of parameters,
(αi, βi). Let the Host A have an average rating Rairbnb and Host B an average rating R
′
airbnb.
If Rairbnb > R
′
airbnb, then from Equation 38 and Equation 39, we have at least one of the
following conditions holds:
αA > αB
βA > βB
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Then, for any positive P3,
Vi(transact with A|P3) > Vi(transact with B|P3) (47)
The marginal guest is defined as the one with Vi(transact|P3, Rairbnb) = 0. Then, from
Equation 47, we know that the marginal guest transacting with Host A can bear a higher
P3 compared to that trading with Host B, since Host A is expected to have higher value of
α or β or both.
Since P3 is determined by
max
P3
{P3Q(P3) +
ˆ
Uh(ei, eh, v
∗
h, rh,i)dF (Ψg)}, (48)
we have that, given that Ψg is the same for Host A and B, P3(Rairbnb) > P3(R
′
airbnb).
A.4 Relaxing the truth-telling assumption
As defined in Section 3.3, we have that
rh,i ≡ φ(vh + u(ei, eh)) (49)
Plugging the equation above into Rairbnb ≡
´
rh,idi we have
Rairbnb =
ˆ
φ(vh + u(ei, eh))di (50)
Now, assume all hosts are faced with an identical pool of guests. Let ωi ≡ vh + u(ei, eh).
From previous results we have:
∂ωi
∂αh
> 0 (51)
Since φ is a weakly increasing mapping, we have
∂φ(ωi)
∂ωi
≥ 0 (52)
The inequality is strict for some ωi.
From the Equations 51 and 52, we have ∂φ(ωi)
∂αh
≥ 0 and the inequality is strict for some
ωi, i.e.,
∂rh,i
∂αh
> 0 (53)
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B Alternative models
B.1 A Simple model
We start with a simple model where we assume the host to be a risk-neutral profit maximizer.
The service quality offered by the host is exogenously given and fixed across transactions.
Further, the service quality is private information of the host and only revealed to the guests
during their stay in the host's property. The distribution of service quality is common knowl-
edge. We assume a monopolistic host and a continuum of guests with heterogeneous tastes.
The guests are located on a line and the host is located at the center. The heterogeneous
taste of guest i is modeled as xi, which denotes the distance between the host and the guest
i, and it follows a uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we assume the
effort cost of publishing a review is zero. The timing of the game is as follows:
• in Period 1, the host posts price P1 and a continuum of guests  the early guests 
enter the market. The early guests can only observe P1. As stated above, the expected
value of service quality, E[vh], is common knowledge. Guests decide whether to request
accommodation. The transaction volume for this set of guests, Q1, is realized.
• in Period 2, the accommodation stay takes place. Service quality is now revealed to
the guest who requests the accommodation. The utility of guest i is vh − xi. At the
end of this period, the guest i publishes a rating rh,i for the host.
• in Period 3, the host observes the ratings received in period 2 and post a new price
P3. A continuum of guests  the late guests  enter the market. Their heterogeneous
taste parameter xi follows the same distribution of the early guests. They observe the
average rating for host h disclosed in Period 2 and the price P3. They make their
accommodation decision accordingly.
We assume that guests truthfully report their utility in the ratings, i.e., rh,i = vh − xi,
where vh denotes the service quality and xi denotes the heterogeneous taste of guest i. We
don't consider this truthtelling assumption is a strong one here, since under this scenario, an
agent does not have incentive to collude with host in inflating ratings. Meanwhile, if agents
truthfully report service quality in the ratings, informative ratings have value to other users
on the platform. Thus, the truthtelling assumption is justified by the phenomenon of warm
glow discussed in (Andreoni, 1990) 11
11Note that since P1 is common knowledge, assuming rh,i = vh − xi or rh,i = vh − xi − P1 is exactly the
same for our analysis.
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Moreover, we assume that the distribution of vh and xi is common knowledge and, hence,
E[vh] is known ex-ante to the guests and E[xi] is known ex-ante to the host.
In this setting, the only choice variable of the host is price. The objective function of the
host is given by:
Vh(P ) = max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ]} (54)
where P denotes price and Q denotes the transaction volume. Vh(P ) denotes the ex-ante
utility contingent on choosing price P . Since the host is risk-neutral and only interested in
expected profits, the utility function coincides with expected profits.
Similarly, the only choice variable of a guest is whether to request accommodation. A
guest requests accommodation from the host if and only if her expected utility from the
accommodation is non-negative. The guest's ex-ante utility prior to the accommodation is
given by:
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P (55)
where Vi(transact|P ) is the ex-ante utility of the guest i if she books the accommodation.
P denotes the price set by the host, vh denotes the service quality, and xi denotes the
heterogeneous taste of guest i. we assume xi to have uniform distribution over [0, 1]).
After staying in the host's property, the guest i publishes a rating rh,i = vh − xi. The
host's rating R ≡ ´ rh,idi depends only on vh and E[vh], as E[vh] determines the pool of
guests requesting accommodation from the host.
In the solution below, we solve backwards for Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Proof. In the first period, early guests make a decision based on E[vh] which is common
knowledge. When the host chooses P1, the marginal guest i
∗ who is indifferent about reserv-
ing the accommodation or not, is given by
E[vh]− xi∗ − P1 = 0. (56)
Guests with x ∈ [0, xi∗ ] book the accommodation. Hence, the first period transaction volume
is
Q1 = xi∗ = E[vh]− P1. (57)
Now let's consider the rating a host receives. The average rating, denoted by R, is given
by
R ≡
´ Q1
0
vh − xidxi
Q1
= vh − Q1
2
. (58)
Since both R and Q1 are common knowledge in Period 3, late guests can infer the value of
vh from vh = R+
Q1
2
. Therefore, the marginal guest in Period 3 is given by vh−xj∗−P3 = 0,
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i.e.,
Q3 = xj∗ = vh − P3. (59)
Hence, the host maximizes profits in Period 3 by solving the following optimality problem:
max
P3
P3Q3 = max
P3
{P3(vh − P3)}. (60)
From the first order condition (FOC), we have P ∗3 =
vh
2
. Then in Period 1, assuming
hosts discount future revenue at rate β, a host solves:
max
P1
{P1(E[vh]− P1) + βP ∗3 (vh − P ∗3 )}. (61)
From the FOC, we have
P1 =
E[vh]
2
(62)
Then from Equations 57 and 62, we have Q1 =
E[vh]
2
. Thus, we have
R = vh − Q1
2
= vh − E[vh]
4
. (63)
For a pool of hosts with vh ∈ [vh, v¯h], the average value of vh is E[vh], hence, the average
ratings of hosts is M =
´
Rjdj =
3
4
E[vh].
Let Rc denote the rating casual hosts and Rp denote the rating of professional hosts.
For Rc to be systematically higher than Rp, we have to assume that the average service
quality of casual hosts is higher than that of professional hosts, i.e., E[vch] > E(v
p
h), where
E[vch] and E[v
p
h] denote the average service quality of casual hosts and of professional hosts,
respectively. Note that casual and professional hosts differ in their market participation
frequency. In this simple model, the service quality of the host is not endogeneously chosen
by the host, hence we lack a mechanism to link a host's market participation frequency with
their ratings. Thus, in order for E[vch] > E[v
p
h], we need to assume that market participation
negatively correlates with the exogenously given service quality. However, this does not
seem to be a natural assumption to make. As higher service quality can translate into
higher ratings which attracts future business, hosts choosing to participate more frequently
should not have less incentive to work hard towards achieving high ratings. If anything, this
rationale suggests that market participation frequency should be positively correlated with
service quality. We conclude that this simple model cannot easily explain why professional
hosts have lower ratings.
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B.2 Relaxing the truth-telling assumption
Next, motivated by the observation that the guests who do not report ratings are likely to
have had a worse experience (Fradkin et al., 2017), we relax the truth-telling assumption.
In doing so, we allow selection bias in ratings. To allow for selection bias, we assume that
guests provide a rating to a host only if the rating is above a threshold θi, i.e.,
1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi (64)
Then the ex-ante utility of the guest i in period 1 is given by
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri − 1{rating}αi|(vh − xi)− rh,i|], (65)
where rh,i denotes the rating guest i gives to the host, and ri denotes the rating the host
gives to the guest i. The term αi denotes the weight of the host's reputation in guest i's
utility.
Compared with the guest's ex-post utility in the simple model (Equation 55), the current
utility function has two new parts. The first part includes 1{rating}|(vh − xi) − rh,i| and
the rating threshold θi. The difference between the disclosed rating and the true level of
the guest's utility captures the guest's disutility derived from reporting a rating different
from the true value of service quality and deteriorating rating informativeness. The term θi
captures the cost (e.g., psychological cost) for a guests to give a low rating. Together, these
terms capture the trade-off faced by the guest when choosing whether to rate a host and
what rating to disclose. While psychological costs may encourage guests to inflate ratings,
guests also have an incentive to provide informative ratings as a contribution to other users
on the platform. The two forces work in opposite direction and together determine the rating
guests report.
The second part is ri, the rating guest i receives from the host, which captures the fact
that the guest i has reputation concerns. The reason for ri to be part of the guest's utility is
to match the Airbnb setting, where a host can rate the guest, and this rating affects whether
future hosts will accept the guest's accommodation request.
In all our analyses, we only consider ratings produced under the new simultaneous Airbnb
reputation mechanism. Therefore, strategic rating manipulation of ratings is not a concern,
i.e., hosts cannot strategically collude with guests to exchange high ratings which implies
that ri is not a function of rh,i.
In the equilibrium of this model, a host receives a higher rating than in the simple model,
and the inflated ratings depend on the average level of θi associated with the pool of the
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guests. While θi may be affected by the interaction between guests and hosts, it seems
unlikely that it is also correlated with market participation, since this information is not
revealed to guests. Unless we are willing to assumme such a correlation, we cannot easily
explain the difference in ratings observed in Section 5.3. The formal proof of this statement
is as follows.
Proof. Under this model, the only choice variable of the guest during Period 2 is rh,i. If
guest i decides to request the accommodation, her ex-ante utility in Period 1 is given by
Vi(transact|P ) = max
rh,i
E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri − αi1{rating}|rh,i − (vh − xi)|}(66)
where 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi.
The ex-post utility of guest i at the end of Period 2 is given by
ui(rh,i) = max
rh,i
{vh − xi + ri − αi1{rating}|rh,i − (vh − xi)|} (67)
where 1{rating} = 1 iff rh,i > θi.
With respect to the best response of guest i, two options exist:
1. If rh,i ≥ θi, then:
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri − αi|rh,i − (vh − xi)|] (68)
ui(rh,i) = [vh − xi + ri − αi|rh,i − (vh − xi)|] (69)
where ui(rh,i) is the ex-post utility after the accommodation stay. Then from Equation
69 and αi > 0, we have:
rh,i = vh − xi. (70)
2. If rh,i < θi, then, the guest i does not publish a rating.
Then the ex-ante utility for a guest to enter the market is given by:
Vi(transact|P ) = E[vh]− xi − P + E[ri] + αi[Prob(vh − xi > θi) ∗ [vh − xi − (vh − xi)](71)
+ (1− Prob(vh − xi > θi)) ∗ 0]
Note that under simultaneous ratings, guest i cannot directly influence ri by choosing the
rating she gives to the host. Thus, the only choice of guest i in Period 1 is to transact if and
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only if E[vh]−xi−P ≥ 0. Therefore, the following conditions still hold: Q1 = x∗i = E[vh]−P1
and P1 =
E[vh]
2
.
Then, the average rating of a host under this model, denoted as Rbiased, is:
Rbiased ≡
´
i rate
rh,idi´
i rate
1di
=
´
i rate
(vh − xi)di´
i rate
1di
= vh −
´
i rate
xidf(xi)´
i rate
di
= vh −
´ x∗∗
0
xidf(xi)´ x∗∗
0
df(xi)
where x∗∗ ≡ min{vh − θi, E[vh]− P1}, and f is the density function of xi.
Then, denoting the average rating in the simple model as Runbiased ≡
´
i rh,idi´
i idi
, we have
that:
Rbiased −Runbiased = g(θ) > 0 (72)
i.e., the average rating under selection bias is higher than the average rating without selection
bias, and their difference is a function of θ. Under this condition, to observe systematically
lower ratings for professional hosts we need to assume that vph is systematically lower than
vch, or that the distribution of v
c
h first order stochastically dominates (FOSD) the distribution
of vph.
Alternatively, to explain the rating patterns observed, we could assume that guests of
professional and casual hosts differ systematically in their θ, the psychological cost of leaving
a bad review. Specifically, guests of professional hosts must have a systematically lower
psychological threshold than guests of casual hosts. However, guests cannot observe hosts
market participation and, thus, they cannot discern between professional or casual hosts;
and hosts cannot infer the guests' θ, so they cannot select a specific type of guest. Thus,
this self-selection of guests depending on the host type (and vice versa) is unlikely to occur
in practice.12
B.3 Relaxing the risk neutral assumption
In this section, we relax the risk-neutral assumption, and allow the behavior of the guests
to enter into the utility function of the host. We propose this modification because of the
nature of Airbnb transactions. Since Airbnb hosts share their own properties, it is natural
12Note that even under the assumption that hosts are able to infer guests' θ, all hosts, and in particular
professional hosts, who have a higher weight on reputation, would select those guests with higher θ in order
to reduce the probability of receiving a lower rating.
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to expect them to be risk-averse towards guest misconduct.
Formally speaking, we assume the effort of the guest i, denoted as ei, to enter into the
utility of the host, and the host's utility is assumed to be concave with respect to ei. The
utility function of the host is given by:
Vh(P ) = max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ] + E[(rh,i + uh(ei))|P ]} (73)
where, as before, P denotes price, Q denotes the transaction volume, and vh(P ) denotes
the ex-ante utility contingent on choosing price P . rh,i is the rating the host receives from
the guest i. The term uh(ei) shows that the guest's effort ei affects the host's welfare.
The concavity of uh captures the risk aversion of the host. Then, hosts trade off expected
profits against the possibility of guest misconduct in accepting guests. While this assumption
reduces the number of guests a host will accept, the host's rating do not affect service quality
since it is still exogenously given and fixed. Formally, the only choice variable is still P and
the optimality problem of the host is reduced to:
max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ] + E[rh,i]}. (74)
Independently of which assumptions are invoked on rh,i, the absence of strategic manipu-
lation of rh,i makes it impossible to alter the optimality problem, which therefore is analogue
to the simple model discussed above.
Moreover, since service quality is exogenously given in this scenario, to explain the sys-
tematically lower ratings to professional hosts we would need to assume that the service
quality of casual and professional hosts follow different distributions, and that the distribu-
tion of vch FOSD the distribution of v
p
h.
B.4 Endogenous service quality
Next, we relax the exogenous service quality assumption. We allow service quality to vary
between transactions. This assumption is consistent with the high heterogeneity of service
quality on Airbnb. In this scenario, we consider three alternative models.
B.4.1 Model I: Hosts only care about profit and reputation
First, we endogenize service quality without changing the assumption that hosts care only
about profit and reputation. The optimality problem of the host in Period 1 is given by:
Uh,1(P ) = max
P
{E[PQ− C(Q)|P ] + E[Uh,2(eh, rh,i)]}. (75)
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Demand is realized in Period 1, while only reputation concerns and effort cost determine
effort levels in Period 2. Then, the host's optimality problem in Period 2 is:
Uh,2(eh, rh,i) = max
eh
{βhrh,i − Ch(eh)}. (76)
Because of their higher market participation, professional hosts have a higher weight
on reputation concerns, i.e., professional hosts have systematically higher βh. With the
assumption that guests report hosts' effort levels in ratings rh,i, i.e., rh,i = eh.
From the FOC, we have
C ′h(eh)
∗ = βh. (77)
The above condition solves for the optimal level of e∗h.
If the effort cost function is identical across hosts, i.e., the function Cp(eh) = Cc(eh) ≡
C(eh) for all eh, and effort costs increase with effort level, i.e., C
′(eh) > 0,∀eh, then profes-
sional hosts exert higher levels effort due to their higher βh, i.e., from βp > βc and C
′
h > 0,
we have e∗p > e
∗
c .
Even if the effort cost function of professional hosts is systematically different from that
of casual hosts, because of economies of scale, it is unlikely that the latter have systematically
lower marginal effort cost than professional hosts.That is, C ′(ep) ≤ C ′(ec) for each eh. Even
if we assume C ′(ep) > C ′(ec) for some eh, the difference in marginal effort cost has to be
large enough to offset the effect of βh so that casual hosts can exert systematically higher
effort under this model. Therefore, this model cannot easily explain why professional hosts
have lower ratings.
B.4.2 Model II: Hosts also care about guest behavior
In this model hosts also care about guest behavior. Hosts on Airbnb are relatively small
service providers compared to firms in the accommodation industry, such as Hilton or Mar-
riott. Therefore, a natural assumption is that hosts are risk- averse with respect to possible
guest misconduct. We model this by letting guest conduct enters hosts' utility function.
However, as we show, simply introducing guest conduct in the utility function of a risk-
averse host does not suffice to explain why professional hosts have lower ratings than casual
hosts. Formally speaking, if we assume ei and eh are separable in the host's utility, guest
behavior cannot alter the host's effort. Thus, we have to further assume a non-separable
function of eh and ei as we do in our main model.
As Uh takes a seperable functional form of ei and eh, without loss of generality we assume
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Uh is given by:
Uh(eh, rh,i) = max
eh
g(ei)− Ch(eh) + βhrh,i (78)
where g(ei) captures the effect of guests' conduct on the host's utility, and the concavity of
g(·) models the host's risk averse attitude towards the guest misconduct.
Assuming rh,i = eh, we have the same FOC as the previous model, i.e., C
′
h(eh)
∗ = βh.
This means that ei does not determine the optimal level of eh and therefore it cannot explain
the difference in ratings between casual and professional hosts.
B.4.3 Model III: Hosts have interdependent preference
Next, we assume that the host has interdependent preference (without assuming the reci-
procity feature discussed in our main theoretical framework), i.e., the utility of guest i,
denoted as Ui, enters into the host's utility function.
Under this assumption, the optimality problem of the host is given by:
Uh(eh, ei, rh,i) = max
eh
g(ei) + αhUi(ei)− Ch(eh) + βhrh,i (79)
where Ui is the ex-post utility of guest i given by Ui(ei, eh, ri) = f(eh)−Ci(ei)+βiri. Also, ei
and eh are the efforts of guest i and the host h, respectively. The function g(·) denotes how
much hosts care about guest's behavior, and f(·) denotes guest utility derived from host's
effort.
To derive a closed-from solution of the optimal effort level, we assume f(eh) = e
1−k
h and
g(ei) = e
k
i , and the effort cost function to be quadratic, i.e., C(eh) =
ch
2
e2h.
After invoking ri = g(ei), rh,i = f(eh), we have:
(αh + βh)f
′(eh) = C ′h(eh) (80)
Then, we have e∗h = (
(1−k)(αh+βh)
ch
)
1
k+1 and
∂e∗h
∂βh
> 0.
If casual hosts differ from professional hosts only in βh, and professional hosts have a
higher level of βh, we have e
∗
p > e
∗
c . Therefore, r
c
h,i < r
p
h,i, ∀i. Thus, the average rating
of professional hosts is expected to be higher than casual hosts, contradicting the what we
observe in the Airbnb data.
In order to explain the systematically lower ratings of professional hosts, we need an
additional assumption. Specifically, we need to assume that casual hosts are systematically
more altruistic than professionals. This assumption can be implemented by adding the
parameters αg in front of the interdependent utility term in the gross utility of the host, and
assuming that the difference on the altruism weights are larger than the difference between
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reputation weights. Formally stated:
αc − αp > βp − βc > 0,
where αc and αp are the weights on guests' utility of the non-professional hosts and the
professional hosts, respectively.
By invoking this assumption, we allow casual hosts to have systematically higher intrinsic
altruism, and the difference between altruistic attitude is large enough to offset the differ-
ence between reputation concerns. However, we consider altruistic behavior to be a larger
departure from standard assumptions, and our explanation based on reciprocity to be more
natural for the setting of Airbnb.
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